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Summary and Keywords
Foreign policy decision making has been and remains at the core of foreign policy 
analysis and its enduring contribution to international relations. The adoption of 
rationalist approaches to foreign policy decision making, predicated on an actor-specific 
analysis, paved the way for scholarship that sought to unpack the sources of foreign 
policy through a graduated assessment of differing levels of analysis. The diversity of 
inputs into the foreign policy process and, as depicted through a rationalist decision-
making lens, the centrality of a search for utility and the impulse toward compensation in 
“trade-offs” between predisposed preferences, plays a critical role in enriching our 
understanding of how that process operates.
FPA scholars have devoted much of their work to pointing out the many flaws in 
rationalist depictions of the decision-making process, built on a set of unsustainable 
assumptions and with limited recognition of distortions underlined in studies drawn from 
literature on psychology, cognition, and the study of organizations. At the same time, 
proponents of rational choice have sought to recalibrate the rational approach to decision 
making to account for these critiques and, in so doing, build a more robust explanatory 
model of foreign policy.
Keywords: foreign policy decision making, rational choice theory, game theory, political psychology
Foreign policy decision making has been and remains at the core of the Foreign Policy 
Analysis project and its enduring contribution to international relations. The tilting effect 
generated by the “decision-making turn” (as one may call it retrospectively) on realism 
and its grip on the study of international relations are mainstreamed now within the 
discipline. The adoption of rationalist approaches to foreign policy decision making, 
predicated on an actor-specific analysis, paved the way for scholarship which sought to 
unpack the sources of foreign policy through a graduated assessment of differing levels of 
analysis. The diversity of inputs into the foreign policy process and, as depicted through a 
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rationalist decision-making lens, the centrality of a search for utility and the impulse 
toward compensation in “trade-offs” between predisposed preferences, plays a critical 
role in enriching our understanding of how that process operates.
On closer examination, however, this seminal contribution to the analysis of foreign policy 
and, concurrently, its continued focus on that aspect of the foreign policy process is open 
to a number of problems. FPA scholars have pointed out the many flaws in rationalist 
depictions of the decision-making process, built on a set of unsustainable assumptions 
and with limited recognition of distortions underlined in studies drawn from literature on 
psychology, cognition, and the study of organizations. From a different perspective, the 
emphasis on foreign policy decision making itself also obscures the significance of foreign 
policy implementation, arguably as consequential in shaping foreign policy and its 
outcomes. At the same time, while these and other concerns have challenged the 
ascendancy of rationality in the field, its proponents have sought to recalibrate the 
rational approach to decision making to account for these critiques.
This chapter will briefly survey rational choice theory and its key assumptions; this will 
be followed by an examination of the role and application of rationality as a method for 
assessing foreign policy decision making, the critiques leveled against individual and 
organizational accounts of rational foreign policy decision making, the efforts to reconcile 
rationality with these critiques, producing new or revised approaches to analysis of 
foreign policy decision making, and, finally, offering up some concluding remarks on the 
enduring influence of rationality.
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The Rational Actor Model
Rationality is a cornerstone in the canon of the positivist tradition of social sciences. It 
informs the problem-solving approach to the study of politics and provides a theoretical 
framework that allows for generalizable propositions and, in some cases, predictive 
assessments. The methodological commitment to a particular form of rationality—that is 
to say a rationalist model of choice in the decision-making process—is meant to be an 
innovation aimed at strengthening its analytical and predictive capabilities. Disciplines as 
different as political science, economics, psychology, and sociology all have their 
proponents who embrace variations of this approach (Zey, 1998, p. 1).
Rational choice theory is a normative approach to analyzing decision making under 
conditions of risk (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, pp. 251–254). Its roots reside in the 
evolution of ideas in the disciplines of classical economics and political philosophy during 
the late 19th century and early 20th century, which sought to develop a more refined and 
eventually policy-oriented approach to reconciling the essential driver of individual 
conduct, self-interest, with the maxim of providing the “greatest good for the greatest 
number” (Levin & Milgrom, 2004, p. 1). Key concepts such as “optimization” (later recast 
as “maximization”) of “utility” underpin the scientific study of choices made by rational 
individuals and collective entities, providing a purposive motivation for action that 
explains both behavior and outcomes. Schematically, rational choices theorists portrayed 
the dilemma of choice confronting decision makers as one being between a set of 
distinctive preferences that are ranked according to their expected utility outcomes. A set 
of four axioms—ranging from cancellation and transitivity to dominance and invariance—
provide a normative framework that shapes our understanding of what are the “rules” 
determining selection of a given policy (Wang, 1996, p. 32). These choices, while subject to 
individual and collective knowledge and expectations, nonetheless are seen by rational 
choice theorists as an accurate depiction of the operational conditions that guide social 
behavior. The problematic of the ordering of preferences into a hierarchy that illuminates 
decision making complicates the rationalist account, something acknowledged by 
scholars working within this approach (Wang, 1996, pp. 31–32).
The appeal of rational choice theory is widespread precisely because it offers social 
scientists a general tool with broad applicability to human endeavors in arguably every 
ambit of existence. Moreover, as scholarship actively linked the aggregate of individual 
preferences to the prospect of improved policy programming, governments found that 
rational choice models gave them a quantitatively sound interpretive basis for developing 
public policies that concurrently satisfied normative commitments to aligning these 
policies more closely to the preferences of the electorate (Levin & Milgrom, 2004, p. 2).
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Rationality and Foreign Policy Decision Making
In the case of international relations (IR), the focus on rationality and decision making 
has been entangled in long-standing ontological and epistemological debates within the 
discipline that continue to influence scholarship in the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis 
(FPA). Realism and its variants, long the dominant school of thought within IR, proposed 
that international politics could be adduced through a reading of state conduct at the 
systemic level without significant reference to the particularities of domestic affairs of 
state and society.
Indeed, while IR scholars such as Kenneth Waltz famously deny that there is any 
explanatory purchase to be found through the study of a particular state’s foreign policy
—“an international-political theory does not imply or require a theory of foreign policy”—
he nonetheless went on to claim that this did not detract from Neorealism as theory 
(Waltz, 1979). Despite this assertion, as John Mearsheimer points out, Waltz’s rejection of 
the rationalism and his unwillingness to even attempt to integrate state conduct into his 
overarching theory of international politics, leads to a host of inconsistencies that render 
its explanatory value dubious at best (Mearsheimer, 2009, pp. 241–256). Subsequent 
efforts by scholars such as Gideon Rose and Fareed Zakaria have sought to ameliorate 
this oversight by introducing the concept of the intervening variable and other theoretical 
innovations, giving rise to neoclassical realism, which edges their analysis closer to 
giving significance to the domestic environment of decision making without formally 
embracing it as a key variable (Rose, 1998; Rathbun, 2008). Resistance to this key 
proposition of FPA, all in pursuit of continuing adherence to the integrity of the 
theoretical propositions of realism, may rightly be considered a logical inconsistency of 
the first order.
These variants of realist theory assess foreign policy outcomes produced by states 
utilizing an epistemology rooted in rationality and, on that basis, purport to explain 
international politics. FPA represents, of course, a calculated break with this approach, 
aiming to “open the black box” of foreign policy as a means of attaining greater analytical 
depth and significance. In that respect alone, notwithstanding the problems that form the 
critiques analyzed in the next section, FPA scholarship demonstrates a stronger 
commitment to the scientific method than its counterparts in the conventional schools of 
international relations (with the exception of post-positivists who naturally have no 
interest in this aspect). Moreover, the focus on foreign policy decision making by first 
generation FPA scholars was a deliberate effort to apply the dictum of theoretical 
parsimony as a valued attribute in the development of a more robust theory of 
international politics (Snyder et al., 1962). Honing in on “actor specific” analysis as the key 
characteristic of its approach, scholars such as Valerie Hudson highlight how FPA’s 
commitment to multidisciplinary eclecticism gives it greater reach across the social 
sciences. All of these factors make FPA stand out as a distinctive project best “positioned 
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to provide the concrete theory that can reinvigorate the connection between IR actor-
general theory and its social science foundation” (Hudson, 2005, p. 1).
So what are the claims that rational choice theorists make when it comes to foreign policy 
decision making? As applied to the study of international affairs, its proponents have 
sought to introduce a more rigorous, methodologically sound approach that could use the 
basic laws of choice to assess the process and outcome of foreign policy decision making. 
Individuals are understood to be rational beings and purposive in pursuit of self-interest. 
From this perspective, the maximization of utility is the ultimate aim of foreign policy, the 
principle actors that serve as the unit of analysis being authoritative decision makers (an 
individual decision maker or sometimes characterized as a collective entity or “decision 
unit”). By maximization of utility, we mean that a foreign policy actor first identifies and 
prioritizes foreign policy goals; the actor then identifies and selects from the means 
available to fulfill the declared aims while incurring the least cost. This cost-benefit 
analysis involves trade-offs between different possible foreign policy positions and, 
ultimately, produces a theory of foreign policy choice that reflects a calculus of self-
interest based on an expectation of utility. In this regard, the focus of this approach 
traditionally is on blinkered depiction of the foreign policy process and as a result 
assumes either an individual decision maker or a relatively undifferentiated collective 
decision-making body for foreign policy (a “unitary actor”) rather than one composed of 
different decision makers with their attendant perspectives on a given policy preference.
Operationalizing the core assumptions in rational decision making, especially those of 
motivation (self-interest) and a single purposive decision maker (unitary actor), can 
produce some compelling explanations of the process and choices pursued in foreign 
policy. In this context, an assessment of “national interest”—generally defined as 
enhancing security and wealth maximization (or, to use the rational choice jargon, 
“preference formation”)—is crucial to determining the actual foreign policy choice under 
consideration. Choices between differing preferences are seen to be generally made 
within the same “domain”—that is, the same category of object.
Some rationalist scholars’ consideration of the sources for foreign policy preferences, 
however, suggests that it is the nature of the international system and the accompanying 
belief in structural parity between states produced by sovereignty (rather than any 
particular domestic feature in a given state), that remains the most significant 
determinant of choice. As all states reside within the same international setting in which 
the conditions of anarchy structure the “rules of the game” of international politics in a 
similar fashion for all states, coming to an interpretation of action and reaction should not 
be out of reach for foreign policy analysts. This perspective is important in enabling 
rationalists to claim that theirs is an approach that has universal applicability and, as 
such, even influences the realist perspective in international relations (Hagan, 2001, p. 6). 
Another expression of the dilemma facing rationalists in explaining the formation of 
preferences that are uncritically assigned “motivational primacy” but, however, are 
notoriously difficult to square with empirical studies of actual decisions and the 
perspectives of those involved. As such the decision-making formulation retains an 
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unrecognized commitment to this rationalist model and its narrow application to the 
decision-making unit, which continues to hold sway over analyses of the decision-making 
process.
Often neglected in the conventional critiques of rationality is the recognition that original 
thinkers in rational choice theory gave to the organizational context of decision making. 
Far from isolating the decision-making process from the larger institutional framework 
within which such decisions are taken, these scholars are quick to underscore that their 
epistemology includes an acknowledgement of the embeddedness of the decision maker 
within an organization (Abell, 2014; Coleman, 1990; Coleman & Fararo, 1993; Zey, 1998). 
Indeed, accounting for particular settings and circumstances, the collective source of 
decision making is held to be a valid one under the rational choice rubric. According to 
Abell:
Organizations are constructed social mechanisms for controlling and coordinating
human activities and symbolic and physical resources in order to achieve certain 
objectives’ … Control mechanisms are the means by which the activities of actors 
(individuals or sometimes groups or collections of individuals) are motivated in 
order to achieve the objectivities of the organization. Coordination mechanisms 
are the means by which the actions of actors (again individual or collective) are 
brought into alignment (often strategically in the sense of game theory) with each 
other in order to achieve the objectives of the organization.
(Abell, 2014)
FPA literature shares elements of this focus on the individual and collective character of 
the foreign policy process, driven by many of the same concerns as well as a concomitant 
search for understanding the pathologies prevalent within collective forms of decision 
making.
At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that one variant of rational choice approach, 
game theory, has gone further in deliberately attempting to model the decision-making 
process with only limited reference to the institutional (or any other) context. Indeed, for 
some observers, game theory modeling is the quintessential distillation of a systemic 
approach to the employment of rationality to the task of understanding foreign policy 
decision making (Alden & Aran, 2017). In this case scholars have isolated particular 
dilemmas in foreign policy and sought to frame them within a matrix of choice that 
illuminates the dilemmas facing decision makers. Game theory is a structured approach 
that in its original form posits a relatively simple matrix of participants and issues that 
allows mathematically derived interpretations of decision making. For game theorists, the 
respective rules of different types of games (cooperative and non-cooperative) frame the 
possibilities of choice undertaken by the participants and the accompanying strategies 
employed to achieve best possible outcomes. Securing “zero-sum” wins that favor one 
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participant over another are contrasted with “win-sets” that feature trade-offs aimed at 
allowing all participants to claim a “winning compromise” even if it is suboptimal.
Of the numerous efforts to apply rationalist approaches to differing aspects of foreign 
policy decision making, Robert Putnam and Thomas Schelling are perhaps most 
indicative. Putnam, utilizing a simple decision-making matrix to international 
negotiations, attempts to explain the contrary outcomes found in trade policy (Putnam, 
1988). Putnam asserts that the best way to understand the behavior of foreign policy 
decision makers is to recognize that they are in fact operating in two separate 
environments, each with a distinctive set of logics that structure choice accordingly. 
Leaders naturally attend to domestic concerns in developing their position on a given 
issue. The fact that the international environment is a “self-help system” conditioned by 
anarchy while the domestic environment functions in accordance with a recognized 
authority structure and accompanying rules, means that foreign policy decision makers 
have to operate in two overlapping—and potentially conflicting—games simultaneously. 
For Putnam, a win-set is only achieved when the outcome reflects the shared interests of 
all the relevant actors and is in tune with the imperatives of the domestic environment 
(Putnam, 1988).
Thomas Schelling’s work on game theory and its application to nuclear strategy 
elaborates upon the classic prisoner’s dilemma schema. Schelling uses the format of 
strategic bargaining with imperfect information in a non-cooperative game to adduce the 
conduct of participants facing decisions in a nuclear arms race (Schelling, 1960). He 
concludes that suboptimal decisions, the by-product of this lack of information, 
encourages a “balance of threat” that directly led to the formulation of a deterrence 
policy predicated on “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) between participants.
Much additional scholarship has gone into game theory in subsequent years, elaborating 
the variety of possible games and delving into aspects of the actors and contexts involved 
(Rasmusen, 2001). What is notable about the utilization of variants of game theory to 
assess foreign policy decision making is the degree to which it tacitly relies upon the 
perceptions of decision makers in structuring the context of negotiations and the process 
that accompanies them. The lack of explicit recognition by rational choice theorists—
though superficially acknowledged in some accounts as an “externality”—of the 
implications that this crucial perceptual factor has on key claims of rationality of the 
entire process opens up a line of criticism which FPA scholars were to pursue with great 
vigor.
Opening Pandora’s Black Box—Rational 
Decision Making and Its Critics
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The “turn” toward foreign policy decision making led by Richard Snyder and others over 
sixty years ago provided the formative basis for launching FPA (Snyder et al., 1962, pp. 
136–160). In this context, scholarship focused on unpacking the “black box” of foreign 
policy decision making as a key to unlocking the complexities of international politics. As 
Snyder and his colleagues point out:
information is selectively perceived and evaluated in terms of the decision maker’s 
frame of reference. Choices are made on the basis of preferences which are in 
part situationally and in part biographically determined.
(Snyder et al., 1962, p. 177)
At the core of the call for the interpretive value of analysis of foreign policy is a focus on 
the “definition of the situation” as the framing device that fundamentally shapes the 
decision-making process in terms of who is involved, what their outlooks are, and the 
course that intergroup dynamics takes in coming to a policy decision. Interestingly, this 
echoes the belated recognition by rational choice theorists that “alternative descriptions 
of a decision problem often give rise to different preferences, contrary to the principle of 
invariance that underlies the rational theory of choice” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, p. 
251). In fact, a close reading of Snyder, Brook, and Sapin’s seminal FPA work, “Decision 
Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics” highlights the sense of a 
continuing commitment to rationality as a method, unencumbered by direct association 
with rational choice theory and despite the authors’ discomfort with its shortcomings, 
while seeking to explore the foreign policy decision-making process in greater depth 
(Snyder et al., 1962). Making sense of the gap between the declared depiction of foreign 
policymaking as rational and an empirically rendered assessment of that same policy 
choice formed the essence of the work of FPA in its first generation and beyond (Hagan, 
2001, pp. 6–8).
Moving for a time in tandem with emergent developments of the study of policy, which 
were undergoing a period of tremendous innovation and change, FPA scholarship initially 
drew from the work produced by the “behaviourist revolution” in the social sciences. This 
was further reinforced a decade later by critiques levelled at rationalist interpretations of 
the role and relationship between institutions and the foreign policy decision making, led 
by Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, which took specific aim at the “rational actor 
model” of foreign policy decision making (Allison & Halperin, 1972).
Challenges to rationalism and foreign policy decision making, therefore, took the 
following forms. There was a distinctive set of critiques in the FPA literature derived from 
the findings of behaviorist and cognitive psychology that focused on the leader as 
decision maker. These include the foundational work of Harold and Margaret Sprout, 
whose division between the “objective” (or operational) environment of foreign policy 
decision making and the “subjective” environment of foreign policy decision making 
paved the way for subsequent scholarship (Sprout & Sprout, 1956). Robert Jervis’s work on 
perception and misperception across a range of historical case studies demonstrated how 
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subjective understandings of reality impacted upon foreign policy decision making (Jervis,
1976). Alexander George went so far as to introduce methodologies, refined and applied by 
numerous other scholars, aimed at discerning the linkage between leaders’ belief systems 
and their influence on foreign policy (George, 1969; Schafer & Walker, 2006; He & Feng, 2013). 
Janis and Mann were the first to explore emotional features such as stress on foreign 
policy decision making, while later authors examined in greater detail through the 
framework of motivational approaches in political psychology (Janis & Mann, 1977; Stein & 
Welch, 1997).
Group dynamics and organizational conduct represent another dimension of actor-
specific analysis of foreign policy. FPA scholars have thrown the spotlight on how the 
functioning of small group decision making and coalitions can exercise a determining 
influence over foreign policy choice (Janis, 1972; ‘t Hart, 1991; Hermann, 2001). This was 
important in realigning the critique of rationality away from the singular focus on 
individuals to their behavior within groups and, ultimately, an assessment of the role that 
organizations play in the foreign policy decision-making process (Hermann, 2001). 
Moreover, it reflected more accurately the original concentration of rational choice 
theory, which maintained that decision making was necessarily embedded within an 
organizational context as noted above. The aforementioned work by Allison and Halperin 
on bureaucratic politics spawned a literature aimed at developing a closer appreciation of 
the part that institutional dynamics played in foreign policy making and, ultimately, raised 
the question of the impact of implementation on that process (Smith & Clarke, 1985).
More generally, foreign policy decision-making theory is itself predicated on a systems 
approach. It assumes that there is a feedback loop of information from the “external 
environment” to policy makers, allowing for readjustment and innovation. Yet the actual 
analysis of decision making still suffers from some significant shortcomings rooted in its 
efforts to model the foreign policy process (Alden & Aran, 2017, pp. 34–40). To meet the 
requirements of an analytical rendering of foreign policy choice, broad sets of variables 
are produced, which are essentially depicted as being outside of history and its cycles, 
without much (or sometimes any) reference to previous decisions or the accompanying 
interpretations by decision makers. As a result, this linear characterization of the foreign 
policy decision-making process often appears over-read and even deterministic at times 
while in other instances it seems to lack an appreciate of the fragmented nature of 
decisions. As Joe Hagan warns us in his historical overview of foreign policy decision 
making in the 20th century, these policy choices took place within decision-making 
structures that were “quite dispersed … (they) channel and focus other influences on 
governments and are themselves variable across international systems and domestic 
political structures” (Hagan, 2001, p. 6).
Beyond this issue, the role of foreign policy implementation as a neglected component of 
the foreign policy equation also remains barely examined; this is especially true with 
respect to varieties of actors, their articulation of the boundaries of foreign policy within 
the confines of states and sub-state institutions, and how the foreign policy decision-
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making process operates under these circumstances (Smith & Clarke, 1985). Agents on the 
ground, their parochial interpretation of national foreign policy directives and the form 
these take when translated into local actions is a feature of the feedback loop that 
arguably is as consequential a part of the decision-making process as the original policy 
formulation itself. Studies of other types of subnational foreign policy actors such as 
provinces remain few and far between as well, rendering the capacity of FPA to provide 
an interpretation of the globalizing international system far less credible.
Critiques of the Rational Actor Model and Foreign Policy Decision Making
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Reconciling Rationality
A number of efforts to reconcile rationalism in its various forms with foreign policy 
decision making have followed in the wake of these critiques.
Christopher Hill’s contribution to rehabilitating rationality is based on concepts that 
sought to account for the constraints on foreign policy decision making. In particular, Hill 
distinguishes between “pure rationality” and “procedural rationality,” suggesting that the 
former is unattainable while the latter conforms to the basic tenets of rational policy 
selection without fully embracing the methodology and its axioms (Hill, 2003, p. 1). 
Moreover, drawing from the seminal work of Herbert Simon, he employs the concept of 
“bounded rationality” and “satisficing” as expressions for the conduct of decision makers 
within the conditions of imperfect knowledge (Hill, 2003, p. 103).
John Steinbruner’s “cybernetic theory” is an ambitious effort to integrate the insights of 
what he calls the rational-analytic and the cybernetic-cognitive approaches to a theory of 
foreign policy. In contrast with the former decision-making model, Steinbruner claims 
that the cybernetic-cognitive model incorporates the more subjective features of the 
foreign policy decision making (Steinbruner, 1974, pp. 327–342). Concurrently, behaviorist 
critiques within FPA have become more elaborated over time. For example, Janice Stein’s 
delving into the role of neurological patterns, a descendant of the original work on 
cognition and its constraining impact of foreign policy decision making, offers another 
explanation of the process and its outcomes (Stein, 2008, pp. 104–109). FPA academics 
working in this tradition such as Jerel Rosati and Deborah Larsen continue to elaborate 
upon the behaviorist school’s critique of rationalist accounts of foreign policy decision 
making, using “schema theory” as a comprehensive approach to understanding the 
complex and fragmented relationship between individuals, their beliefs, and foreign 
policy choice (Alexrod, 1973; Rosati, 1995; Larson, 1994).
Concurrently, behavioral economists working within the rationalist school have 
themselves been grappling with the anomalies produced by rational choice theory. 
Following Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, the difficulties in developing a 
generalizable set of propositions from these and other accounts is intertwined with the 
underlying lack of transparency of the process for participants and the inadequacies of 
capturing the human dimension of decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986, pp. 272–
273). Interestingly, their admission that “the introduction of psychological considerations 
(i.e. framing) both enriches and complicates the analysis of choice,” includes an 
acknowledgment of the idea of “bounded rationality” while Coleman attempts to account 
for such behavioral anomalies by invoking the phrase that actors are “rational in their 
own terms” (Coleman, 1990). Other scholars, writing within the framework of new 
institutionalism, employ the term “logic of appropriateness” to capture the constitutive 
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set of rules and practices that prescribe conduct for individuals and groups (March & 
Olsen, 2008, pp. 5–7).
The use of “prospect theory” provides another example of the re-occurring influence of 
rational choice theory in FPA. Tversky and Kahneman adopt a two-stage approach to the 
capture the dynamics of the decision-making process (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Accordingly, the first stage (which they characterize as a “framing and editing” phase) 
establishes a reference point against which perceptions of loss and gain are measured 
while the second stage consists of a conventional evaluation and weighting of possible 
choices in light of the prior framework. Prospect theory essentially demonstrates that 
individuals tend to give greater weight to their fear of expected loss than expected gains 
when confronted by choice. FPA scholars such as Jack Levy and David Welch have seized 
upon this idea as one which has direct relevance for the study of foreign policy decision 
making (Levy, 1997; Welch, 2005).
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita’s employment of “expected utility theory” represents a further 
application of rational actor theory to the task of understanding foreign policy decision 
making. In this case, Bueno de Mesquita seeks to explain the decision-making process 
behind the choice to go to war by elaborating upon the conditions under which a given 
state’s power is “the central determinant” to such decisions to initiate conflict (Bueno de 
Mesquita, 1980, p. 930). Among his findings is an interpretation of the rationale for the 
launching of wars by weaker states and the onset of conflict between once-allied states.
Alex Mintz’s work on “polyheuristic theory” is arguably the most innovative contribution 
to a revival of rationalist interpretations of foreign policy decision making in recent years. 
Mintz took up the challenge of reconciling the critique posed by behaviorists and 
reconciling it with a rational choice approach to decision making (Mintz, 2004). He 
suggests that this can be done by breaking foreign policy decision making into two 
separate stages. The first phase involves “non-compensatory” and cognitive factors are 
given consideration by the decision maker, which in practical terms means reflecting 
upon the impact of a particular foreign policy choice on the prospects for the leader’s 
political survival (Mintz & Geva, 1997, pp. 82–87). The second phase resembles more 
conventional rational choice approaches, involving the weighing of policy options that are 
deemed to be “compensatory” and within the same dimension in conformity to 
maximizing utility. Interestingly, in certain respects “polyheuristic theory” resembles the 
approach adopted in “prospect theory,” embarking on a two-stage sequencing of the 
decision-making process to allow for the incorporation of a cognitive component to the 
model (Levy, 1997). Mintz’s “polyheuristic theory” has gathered a solid following among 
FPA scholars studying decision making and with that a steadily growing literature (Mintz 
& Geva, 1997; Mintz, 2004; Dacey & Carlson, 2004; DeRoen & Sprecher, 2004; James & Zhang, 
2005; Min, 2007).
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Conclusion: The Enduring Influence of 
Rationality
In spite of a sustained and often well-substantiated critique, aspects of rationality and 
rational approaches to the understanding of foreign policy continue to hold an appeal for 
FPA scholars. This generates a periodic reproduction of some fundamental discussions 
conducted in the first generation of literature around the saliency of rationality and how 
to account for and theorize about the now recognized problems associated with it. In light 
of this, it is arguable that the most enduring influences of rationality are twofold.
The first is founded in the continuing emphasis on foreign policy decision making as a 
crucial source of analytical meaning for the study of international politics. Given that that 
decision-making analysis forms the core concept within rational choice framework, the 
pull of that particular approach and its utilitarian assumptions has over FPA is bound to 
persist for scholars working in this tradition as they attempt to derive meaning from the 
act of decision. New developments in rational choice theory will therefore find their way 
into FPA as a matter of course. The adoption of “prospect theory” and integration of 
“polyheuristic theory” into the FPA canon is but the latest examples of this phenomenon.
The second is in the tacit mirroring of the classic ontological division adopted by 
positivism between the systemic (macro) and collective organizations (micro), but 
crucially all based on an elaboration of a rationalist-utilitarian theory of the individual. 
This has the effect of raising questions and problems that are familiar to and within the 
domain of other positivist disciplines, for instance making sense of the gap between the 
systemic interpretations derived from macro-economics and “firm level” accounts in 
micro-economics as to the sources and conduct of forces and actors in the economy. The 
divide between IR’s systemic approach to understanding international politics and FPA’s 
focus on “state-level” analysis presents a similar quandary. What is perhaps distinctive 
about FPA when set against these other academic fields is that its concerns are those of a 
self-described “boundary discipline” poised between the domestic-international divide 
and consequently forced to consider multiple platforms for policy making, its impact and 
accompanying feedback.
In the end, the discomfort threaded through the findings of FPA on rational choice theory 
chimes with more generalized critiques of rationality and decision making emanating 
from other branches of the social sciences (Green & Shapiro, 1994). With its commitment 
to foreign policy decision making as the analytical touchstone for understanding foreign 
policy and more generally international politics, deliberations around rationality are set 
to continue to feature in the literature. In this respect, far from being outside the 
mainstream of social sciences, FPA is contributing its own insights into these 
contemporary debates.
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